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11		TRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12	SAN FRAN	ICISCO DIVISION
13	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and)
14	NORTH COAST UNIFIED AIR	,)
15	QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT) No. 3:16-cv-00961-JD
16	Plaintiffs,	,)
17		UNITED STATES' NOTICE OFMOTION AND MOTION TO ENTER
18		PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE;
19	V.) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
20)
21	BLUE LAKE POWER, LLC,) Judge: Hon. James Donato
22	Defendant.	Courtroom: 11 Hearing Date (Preliminary):
23	Defendant.	December 15, 2016
24		Hearing Time (Preliminary): 10:00am
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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 15, 2016, at 10:00am, or at such other date as may be agreed upon, in Courtroom 11 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, Plaintiff the United States of America ("United States") will and hereby do move this Court to enter, as a final judgment in this matter, the Consent Decree attached to this Motion as Exhibit 1 by signing it on page 41 and filing it.¹

As set forth in the accompanying Memorandum in Support of this Motion, the Court should sign and enter the proposed Consent Decree, because it is fair, reasonable, consistent with the goals of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), and in the public interest.

Defendant Blue Lake Power, LLC ("Defendant") and co-Plaintiff the North Coast
Unified Air Quality Management District ("District") have consented to entry of the decree
without further notice. (Exh. 1at ¶ 103). However, under this Court's September 8, 2016 Minute
Order (ECF No. 43), this Motion will be opposed by Proposed Plaintiff-Intervenor Blue Lake
Rancheria (the "Tribe").

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

A court should approve a consent decree if it is fair, reasonable, and consistent with the public interest and objectives of the statute at issue. *United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp.*, 50 F.3d 741, 743 (9th Cir. 1995). The revised Consent Decree requires Defendant to undertake the following actions related to its biomass (wood-fired) power plant, in Blue Lake, California:

¹ The Consent Decree attached as Exhibit 1 is identical to the one lodged as ECF No. 41-1, with one edit to allow the Court's signature to be on one page.

- keep the facility shut down until its broken electrostatic precipitator is fixed;
- install and operate new, repaired, or improved, pollution control equipment to reduce emissions of oxides of nitrogen, carbon monoxide, and particulate air pollutants from the wood-fired boiler;
- develop and comply with operating procedures to minimize carbon monoxide and dust from wood piles and roads;
- obey new emission limits;
- pay \$10,000 into a Wood Stove Incentive program (to reduce particulate matter emissions from other properties); and pay a nominal civil penalty.

The Court's approval of the Consent Decree will also resolve Plaintiffs' claims in this case; the alternative to the consent decree is likely several years of litigation, with uncertain results. Indeed, under the Defendant's likely litigation posture, the court might not impose any relief. And, during that period of litigation, Defendant might continue to operate its facility with old equipment, under the less stringent emission limits of its extant permit. The Consent Decree is thus an appropriate path forward and should be approved.

II. Public Comments and Revision of the Consent Decree

On February 26, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging violations of the CAA at Defendant's facility (ECF No. 1), and simultaneously lodged a proposed Consent Decree. (ECF No. 2). Under 28 C.F.R. § 50.7, the proposed Consent Decree was subject to a 30-day period for the Department of Justice to receive public comment on the proposed settlement. Notice of the proposed Decree was published in the Federal Register in March, 81 Fed. Reg. 11,591 (March 4, 2016), and the comment period closed in April. The United States received 26 public comments (*i.e.*, 26 unique letters or emails, excluding one duplicate submission) on the Consent Decree, which are attached as Exhibit 3 to this Motion (with personal contact information redacted). The majority of these letters are variations on a standard form letter. The United States has responded to the concerns raised by the public comments at length in a "Response to Comments," attached as Exhibit 4. This memorandum explains the bases for the United States' position that this Court

should approve the revised Consent Decree and responds to the issues raised by the commenters.²

In response to the comments on the original Consent Decree and new information received post-lodging, the three Parties agreed to revise the Consent Decree.³ That revised Decree is attached as Exhibit 1, and the revisions are shown in red-line as Exhibit 2. This Motion and Memorandum relate to the revised Decree.

III. BACKGROUND

A. Requirements of the Clean Air Act

The CAA establishes a statutory scheme designed "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). The Act's "Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality" ("PSD") provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492, are designed to protect public health and welfare, to assure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air resources, and to assure that any decision to permit increased air pollution is made only after careful evaluation of all the consequences of such a decision and after adequate opportunities for public participation in the decision making process. See 42 U.S.C. § 7470.

The PSD provisions prohibit owners and operators of large air pollutant emission sources from making certain modifications to those sources, without also obtaining a permit and installing and employing pollution controls. Specifically, a "major emitting facility," 42 U.S.C. §

² Exhibit 4 combines the individual letters into thematic statements of concern: where several comment letters discuss the penalty amount, those are responded to as one "comment." A chart at the end of the Response to Comments indicates which comments are implicated by which "comment" in the Response to Comments document.

³ A second public comment period is not required, because the revisions were made to respond to comments and only strengthen the obligations and substance of the originally-lodged Consent Decree. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7.

7479(1), must not be "constructed" or modified⁴ without first meeting several requirements, including: (1) obtaining a permit setting forth "emission limitations"; and (2) being subject to the "best available control technology" ("BACT"). 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1), (4). BACT reduces emission of pollutants from such sources, including pollutants such as nitrogen oxides ("NOx"), carbon monoxide ("CO") and particulate matter of less than 10 microns in diameter ("PM₁₀"). A BACT determination is made on a case-by-case basis for each source by the permitting authority (here, the District). (Exh. 5, Declaration of Mark Sims ("Sims Decl.") at ¶ 11).

Under the CAA, each State must adopt and submit to EPA for approval a State Implementation Plan that includes, among other things, regulations that contain a PSD program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7471. Upon EPA approval, State Implementation Plan requirements are federally enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 7413, and 40 C.F.R. § 52.23. EPA approved the District's PSD Rules as part of the California State Implementation Plan in 1985. *See* 50 Fed. Reg. 30,941 (July 31, 1985) and 50 Fed. Reg. 19,529 (May 9, 1985). The District Rules incorporate the PSD requirements set forth above. *See* Complaint (ECF No. 1) ¶¶ 34-48.

B. The Complaint

Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed pursuant to §§ 113(b) and 167 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b) and 7477, and seeks injunctive relief and civil penalties for violations of the PSD provisions of the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and the federally-approved District regulations incorporated into the California State Implementation Plan. Defendant's facility consists of a biomass-fired electricity generating unit, which began operations in 1987. (ECF No. 1, at ¶ 64). The Complaint alleges that the facility shut down between 1999 and 2010 and that, prior to restarting it in 2010, Defendant carried out major modifications of the facility.

⁴ The term "construction" includes "modification," 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C), which is further defined in EPA' CAA regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(i).

(ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 77-88). The Complaint further alleges that these modifications resulted in significant net emissions increases, thus triggering PSD requirements, including the obligations to obtain permits and install and operate BACT for CO, NOx and PM₁₀. (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 87-90). Defendant denies the violations alleged in the Complaint. (Exh. 1 at 1). Nonetheless, the Parties entered into extensive negotiations with hopes to resolve Defendant's potential liability at the Facility. The proposed revised Consent Decree is that settlement.

C. Summary of Revised Consent Decree Requirements

Through installation and operation of pollution control devices and imposition of stringent pollution limits, the Consent Decree will secure reductions in NOx, CO, and PM₁₀, and yield substantial benefits to the environment and the public. EPA estimates these reductions will be between 226 to 301 tons per year of CO, 13 to 25 tons per year of NOx, and 5 to 10 tons per year of PM₁₀. (Sims Dec., at ¶ 29). The Consent Decree also secures a civil penalty, and requires Defendant to contribute to the District's Wood Stove Replacement program in order to mitigate harm to public health and the environment caused by its emissions. (Exh. 1 at ¶¶ 8, 41).

1. Injunctive Relief Provisions

To control NOx and CO emissions from the Facility, the Decree requires Defendant to install and continuously operate a Selective Non-Catalytic Reduction ("SNCR") system and an improved forced overfire air ("OFA") system for its boiler. (Exh. 1, at ¶ 15). This technology has been determined to be BACT for boilers for at least one new biomass facility. (Sims Dec. at ¶ 40). Retrofitting new pollution control equipment to an existing boiler can require additional engineering analysis to determine the optimal configuration of the new equipment with the boiler and the necessary design requirements for the pollution control equipment. (Sims Dec. at ¶ 47). Defendant must conduct such a study and submit a report to EPA for approval that includes those

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recommendations. (Exh. 1 at ¶ 13). Once approved by EPA, in consultation with the District, the Defendant is required to take all actions recommended by the report. *Id.* at ¶¶ 13 and 35.

To control PM₁₀ emissions from the Facility's stack, the Decree requires Defendant to ensure that it is efficiently operating its ESP, which is widely-used pollution control technology for PM_{10} from a boiler. (Sims Dec. at ¶ 40). First, prior to restarting operations at the Facility, Defendant must take certain steps: fix the broken plates;⁵ hire a consultant to inspect its ESP and boiler, recommend optimized parameters for the ESP; and train Defendant's employees on proper ESP operation. (Exh. 1 at ¶ 16). Defendant must submit the recommended parameters to EPA and the District and immediately operate its ESP in compliance with those parameters. *Id.* Second, within 60 days of restarting its boiler, Defendant must submit to EPA and the District for approval a comprehensive ESP optimization plan that meets Compliance Assurance Monitoring plan requirements, including real-time monitoring of its ESP operating parameters. (Id. at ¶ 16.d; Sims Dec. ¶ 44). Proper operation of the ESP should reduce emissions of PM10, as well as emissions of pollutants that are not a subject of this enforcement action, such as particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5 microns or less (PM_{2.5}). (Sims Dec. ¶ 35). As of September 22, 2016, Defendant has submitted a draft ESP Optimization Plan to EPA and the District. (Sims Dec. ¶ 45).

Once installed, Defendant must operate the SNCR, the improved OFA, and the ESP at all times and meet specified emission rates for NO_x , CO, and PM_{10} . (Exh. 1 at ¶¶ 15, 16, 18, 19). After the SNCR and OFA are installed and have been continuously operated for a year (the "demonstration period"), if Defendant cannot meet the emission limits set forth in Paragraphs 18-19 of the Decree, it may petition EPA and the District for less stringent limits not to exceed

⁵ This provision was added by the revisions to the original Consent Decree. Exh. 2 (redline).

specified limits. (Exh. 1 at \P 21). EPA and the District will only grant such a petition if Defendant can demonstrate that, even when properly maintaining and operating its equipment and pollution controls, it is technically infeasible for the Facility to meet the initial limits. *Id.* at \P 21-22. EPA may deny the petition, grant the petition, or approve a final achievable limit different from that proposed based on its analysis of emissions data. *Id.* During the demonstration period, Defendant will not be subject to stipulated penalties for exceeding the emission limitations in the Decree unless it fails to continuously operate any of the pollution control equipment or fails to maintain and operate its equipment in a manner that optimizes combustion and minimizes emissions. *Id.* at \P 20.

To control fugitive dust and ash from leaving the Facility's property, Defendant has submitted to EPA and the District for approval the following plans: 1) a Fuel Management Plan to keep its fuel source dry (burning wet wood is a source of CO from the boiler) and to minimize fugitive dust from other fuel handling activities; and 2) a Fugitive Road Dust Plan to minimize fugitive dust emissions from vehicle traffic on dirt roads. (Exh. 1 at ¶¶ 25-27). Once approved, Defendant must comply with these plans at all times. *Id.* at ¶ 35. Finally, Defendant must implement the ash handling provisions in Paragraph 27 upon recommencing operation of the boiler. *Id.* at ¶ 27. Although the emission reductions that will result from the implementation of these plans cannot be quantified, both EPA and District personnel believe these steps will decrease fugitive dust and ash from the Facility. (Sims Dec. ¶ 60-63; Wilson Dec. ¶ 22).

Finally, once the final emission limits are established under the Decree, Defendant is required to apply for a federally-enforceable permit from the District that includes all the

⁶ Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the revised Decree reflect that Defendant has already submitted to EPA and the District its Fuel Management Plan and the Fugitive Dust from Roads Plan. (Exh. 1 at ¶¶ 25-26).

requirements and limitations established in the Consent Decree (e.g., compliance with the Fuel Management Plan, ESP Optimization Plan, emission limits, etc). (Exh. 1 at ¶ 78). The requirements of that permit will be incorporated into the Facility's Title V permit and will, therefore, survive the termination of the Consent Decree. *Id.*

2. Penalty and Mitigation Project

The Consent Decree requires Defendant to pay a \$5,000 civil penalty to the United States and the District. (Exh. 1 at ¶ 8). As a means of mitigating the environmental harm caused by BLP's alleged violations, the Consent Decree requires Defendant to contribute \$10,000 to the District's Wood Stove Incentive Replacement Program. *Id.* at 41. This program replaces older wood stoves with cleaner heating devices and, thus, reduces emissions of particulate matter. (Sims Dec. ¶ 29; Wilson Dec ¶ 22). The Decree provides that the District will prioritize the use of Defendant's contribution in the area immediately surrounding the Facility. (Exh. 1 at ¶ 41).

3. Resolution of Claims

The Consent Decree resolves the United States' and the District's civil claims that arose from the modifications undertaken at the Facility between 2008 and 2010 through the date of lodging of the Decree (February 26, 2016). (*Id.* at ¶ 87).

IV. LEGAL STANDARD FOR ENTRY OF A CONSENT DECREE

Approval of a proposed consent decree is within the informed discretion of the district court. *United States v. Oregon*, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990). The court reviews the decree to determine whether it is fair, reasonable, and consistent with the objectives of the statute at issue. *Montrose Chem. Corp.*, 50 F.3d at 743 (citation omitted). A court may not modify a proposed consent decree before entry; it must either approve or reject the settlement agreed upon by the parties. *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n*, 688 F.2d 615, 630 (9th Cir. 1982).

The court's review is informed by the "overriding public interest in settling and quieting litigation." *United States v. McInnes*, 556 F.2d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 1977); *see also Speed Shore Corp. v. Denda*, 605 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Settlement agreements conserve judicial time and limit expensive litigation."). In reviewing a consent decree, the court "need not inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties nor reach and resolve the merits of the claims or controversy, but need only determine that the settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable and appropriate under the particular facts and that there has been valid consent by the concerned parties." *Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch*, 718 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal citation omitted). Especially when reviewing a consent decree involving a federal agency, as is the case here, a district court "must refrain from second-guessing the Executive Branch." *Montrose Chem. Corp.*, 50 F.3d at 746 (quoting *United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp.*, 899 F.2d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 1990)). The court's "deference is particularly strong where the decree has been negotiated by the Department of Justice on behalf of an agency like EPA which is an expert in its field." *United States v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.*, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2005).

V. ARGUMENT: THE PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT.

A. The Settlement is Fair.

In assessing a proposed settlement, courts consider both procedural and substantive fairness. *Cannons Eng'g Corp.*, 899 F.2d at 86-88.

1. Procedural Fairness

Typically, courts examine procedural fairness to determine whether the negotiation process was "fair and full of adversarial vigor." *Chevron U.S.A. Inc.*, 380 F.Supp. 2d at 1111 (internal quotation omitted). Procedural fairness calls for consideration of the "candor, openness, and bargaining balance" of the negotiations. *United States v. Wallace*, 893 F. Supp. 627, 632

(N.D. Tex. 1995). In this case, the parties were represented by counsel with experience negotiating Clean Air Act settlements and engaged in good faith, arm's-length negotiations for a period of almost two years following issuance of a March 2014 Notice of Violation by EPA before reaching the proposed settlement. (Sims Dec. ¶ 13-15). In addition to counsel, to resolve complicated technical issues, all parties relied on technical expertise: for the agencies, experienced engineers, and for the Defendant, an experienced technical consultant. (Sims Dec. ¶ 1, 3, 14, 16; Wilson Dec. ¶ 1, 18, 19; Burke Dec. ¶ 1, 6). Indeed, negotiations continued after the public comment period closed. (Sims Dec. ¶ 27). The proposed settlement is not the "product of collusion," but rather a reflection of the efforts all Parties to reach a just and equitable resolution. *See Chevron*, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1111; *United States v. Colorado*, 937 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1991).

Commenters raised two issues that appear to relate to procedural fairness; neither of these issues provide a basis for concluding the Consent Decree is procedurally unfair. First, a few commenters mentioned that District Counsel may have a conflict of interest and others mentioned the District was biased towards the Facility. *See* Exh. 3 and 4 (Response to Issue #4). The District disputes these allegations. (Exh. 9, Declaration of Nancy Diamond ("Diamond Dec."), ¶¶ 4-12; Wilson Dec. ¶¶ 11-18). Notwithstanding these comments, there is no suggestion that the United States had a conflict of interest or bias during negotiations, and the United States was central to the negotiation of all terms of this Consent Decree. (Sims Dec. ¶ 28). Negotiations involving DOJ, the District, and Defendant have been constant and ongoing for at least the last

⁷ As noted above, in addition to the discussion here, the United States has also provided detailed responses to all comments in its Response to Comments, Exhibit 4. *See* Responses to Issues #2, 13

⁸ Where individual comments are identified by the "Response to Comment" number in Exhibit 4, individual comments related to the topic may be identified by the chart at the end of that exhibit.

20 months and, indeed, continued after the public comment period closed. (Sims Dec. ¶ 13-27). Thus, this comment does not provide a basis for concluding the Consent Decree negotiations were procedurally unfair.

Second, the Tribe commented that the EPA, in negotiating the Consent Decree, failed to act in accordance with trust responsibilities owed to the Tribe, and that the Tribe should have been included in the negotiation of the Consent Decree. (Exh. 3; Exh. 4, Response to Issue #3). Although the United States was not required to include the Tribe in settlement discussions, 9 it nonetheless conducted significant outreach to the Tribe from September 22, 2015 onwards. DOJ and EPA met with the Tribe to discuss the notice of violation and the Facility in September 2015 and considered the Tribe's concerns and information prior to signing and lodging the proposed Consent Decree in February 2016. (Sims Dec. ¶ 20; Ebbert Decl. ¶ 3-6). DOJ and EPA made an effort to ensure the Tribe was able to take full advantage of the public comment process for the Consent Decree, including sending the Tribe a copy of the Decree upon lodging and traveling to Blue Lake, California to meet with the Tribe prior to the close of the public comment period. (Ebbert Dec. ¶ 8; Sims Decl. ¶ 21). Finally, EPA and DOJ met with the Tribe after the comment period was closed and before negotiations on the revised Consent Decree were concluded, and

⁹ Though we agree that the United States has an ongoing trust relationship with the Tribe, we disagree that the EPA or DOJ has acted contrary to any specific trust obligation to the Tribe or its members, including with respect to tribal participation in settlement negotiations with Defendant. Trust duties are imposed by statute and regulation rather than the common law. *See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation*, 564 U.S. 162, 173–74 (2011) (citing *United States v. Navajo Nation*, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003)). We are aware of no statute or regulation requiring tribal participation in settlement negotiations for Clean Air Act violations at non-tribal facilities not located on Indian lands. Similarly, the action here is an enforcement matter that EPA referred to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ Policy on Tribal Consultation states that DOJ will consult on policies that have tribal implications but makes clear that "policies" does not include matters (like the one here) that are the subject of investigation, anticipated or active litigation, or settlement negotiations. *See* Department of Justice Policy on Tribal Consultation, DOJ Policy Statement 0300.01 at 4 (Aug. 29, 2013); www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/otj/docs/doj-memorandum-tibal-consultation.pdf.

made revisions to the Consent Decree based, in part, on the Tribe's comments. (ECF No. 21 at 8; Exh. 2 (highlighting changes including expedited timelines and an earlier particulate matter stack test, among other concerns raised in the Tribe's comments); Sims Dec. ¶ 23).

Therefore, the Consent Decree negotiations were procedurally fair and the comments do not provide a basis to conclude otherwise.

2. Substantive Fairness

In considering substantive fairness, "the Court does not determine whether 'the settlement is one which the court itself might have fashioned, or considers ideal." United States v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 776 F. Supp.2d 1007, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citation omitted). Rather, "[t]he court need only be satisfied that the decree represents a reasonable factual and legal determination." State of Oregon, 913 F.2d at 581 (internal quotation omitted). Here, while the United States has extensive authority to seek permanent injunctive relief to rectify and mitigate Clean Air Act violations, obtaining injunctive relief in litigation would depend upon both a finding of liability and a judicial assessment of the necessary relief. While successful in pursuing litigation in enforcement actions involving similar claims, the United States has received adverse rulings in some cases. See United States v. Cinergy Corp., 623 F.3d 455 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 291 (3rd Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1118 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (discussing defenses and risks associated with this type of litigation in context of approving a CAA consent decree). The proposed Consent Decree reflects the parties' careful and informed assessment of the relative merits of each other's claims, while taking into consideration the costs and risks associated with litigation.

B. The Settlement is Reasonable and Appropriate.

The most important criterion for the court to consider in determining whether the proposed Consent Decree is reasonable is its "likely effectiveness as a vehicle for cleansing the [environment]" *United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc.*, 949 F.2d 1409, 1437 (6th Cir. 1991). The proposed Decree secures injunctive relief and an environmental mitigation project that will reduce emissions of pollutants and an appropriate civil penalty. (Sims Dec. ¶ 29; Wilson Dec. ¶¶ 23-24 (describing the mitigation project and benefits of the program))

1. Injunctive Relief

The injunctive relief required by this Decree will reduce the amount of harmful air pollution emitted each year by this Facility through installation of pollution controls. The replacement of wood stoves in the vicinity of the Facility will further serve to remedy the environmental harm due to Defendant's emissions of NOx, CO, and PM₁₀. It has been negotiated by the Department of Justice with EPA – an agency with technical expertise and a statutory mandate to enforce the Clean Air Act. *Akzo Coatings*, 949 F.2d at 1436; *see also SEC v. Randolph*, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) (court should defer to the agency's decision that consent decree is appropriate and simply ensure that it is fair, adequate and reasonable). Here, the Consent Decree satisfies the goal of providing an effective vehicle for addressing the harm to the environment from the alleged violations.

The United States has considered each issue raised by commenters regarding the stringency of the injunctive relief, including the emission limits, monitoring provisions, timelines for the implementation of the injunctive relief, the request that the Facility be shut down either permanently or until certain conditions were satisfied, and the comment that the Facility should be required to obtain a new permit. The United States has provided detailed technical responses to each of these comments in its attached Response to Comments. (Exh. 4, Responses to Issues

#9-16). Moreover, the revised Consent Decree addresses some commenters' concerns related to the timelines under the Consent Decree by expediting requirements that could be implemented prior to restart and adding requirements to ensure that the Facility's particulate matter control equipment is operating properly at restart. (Exh. 2, ¶¶ 12, 13, 16, 25, 26, 33.a).

The comments related to the injunctive relief do not, however, persuade the United States that the injunctive relief required under the Consent Decree is unreasonable or inadequate. If the United States were to litigate these claims, it would likely ask the Court to order the Facility to determine BACT, including emission limits. While EPA has not done a full BACT analysis for the Facility, it believes that the emission rates and control technology required by the Decree are comparable to those for similarly-situated facilities that have gone through a full BACT analysis. (Sims Dec. ¶ 32, Exh. 1). When determining the appropriate injunctive relief, the United States must weigh the possibility that it could get more protective emission controls after litigation against the risks that it will not prevail at all on its claims or that the Court could order less protective controls. In the litigation scenario in any case, any emission reductions from the Facility would be delayed by lengthy litigation. The Consent Decree unquestionably secures prompt and appropriate environmental benefits by requiring the Defendant to take immediate steps to reduce emissions of the pollutants at issue in the United States' claims (CO, NO_x, and PM₁₀).

2. Civil Penalty

The civil penalty assessed under the Consent Decree is also reasonable. To arrive at the penalty amount of \$5,000, the Department of Justice and EPA applied the Clean Air Act's statutory penalty factors contained in 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1), which includes "the economic impact of the penalty on the business." Defendant submitted financial documentation, including

tax returns and balance sheets, to the United States in support of a claim that it was financially unable to pay a penalty. (Sims Dec. ¶ 17). A qualified financial analyst reviewed those documents and opined to DOJ and EPA that Defendant had no ability to pay more than a nominal civil penalty. *Id.* The United States weighed the statutory penalty factors against the evidence and risks of litigation, including the potential delay in securing injunctive relief to reduce emissions from the Facility. The United States also considered the cost of installing the required injunctive relief, which was originally estimated to be \$700,000. *Id.* ¶ 18 (noting that the cost of injunctive relief under the revised Consent Decree is now \$800,000). Weighing these factors, the civil penalty required by the Decree is reasonable and consistent with the statutory factors set forth in Section 113(e) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e).

Although almost every commenter objected that the civil penalty was too low and the Tribe specifically argued the penalty was inadequate for deterrence and failed to take into account willfulness or negligence, these comments do not provide a basis for concluding the Consent Decree is unreasonable or inadequate. The Consent Decree favors expenditures on pollution control over a higher penalty amount, in a circumstance in which the defendant has limited financial resources. In litigating to judgment, the United States might or might not secure a larger civil penalty judgment against BLP; but even if a larger sum were secured, payment may not have been received for years, if ever, while the case was litigated, during which time the Facility would not be required to install pollution controls.

C. <u>The Settlement is Consistent with the Objectives of the Clean Air Act and in the Public Interest.</u>

A primary purpose of the Clean Air Act is "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). This settlement serves the Act's goals of reducing air

pollution, including NOx, CO, and PM₁₀, and does so without the need for costly and time-consuming litigation. *See Wis. Elec.*, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1121. Additionally, the Consent Decree furthers the public interest by encouraging voluntary settlement and providing a "speedy and reasonable remedy for the dispute." *Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co.*, 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976); *see also Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce*, 672 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Settlement is to be encouraged.") (citing *McInnes*, 556 F.2d at 441). The Consent Decree furthers the public interest by achieving emission reductions without the burdens and uncertainties of trial.

D. <u>The Public Comments to the Proposed Consent Decree Do Not Provide a Basis</u> for Rejecting the Settlement.

The United States has carefully considered the comments received in response to the Consent Decree, and determined that they do not provide a basis for withdrawing the consent decree or modifying it beyond those amendments described above. The United States does not believe the comments justify any delay in the Court's approval of this settlement. A brief response to some of the comments not already addressed above is included below, while a more comprehensive response is attached in Exhibit 4. As noted above, all technical comments are addressed in detail in Exhibit 4.

Comment: A number of commenters, including the Tribe, requested that the Facility be shut down permanently, or that the Facility be shut down temporarily pending either issuance of a new permit or implementation of the injunctive relief. (Exh. 3).

Response: ¹⁰ In response to the information that the Facility's ESP was damaged and the comments, the Parties revised the Consent Decree to require the Defendant to delay restart until

¹⁰ For a more detailed response, see Exhibit 4, Response to Issue #9.

the ESP was repaired and for BLP to take steps prior to restart to optimize the operation of the ESP. (Exh. 1 at ¶ 16.a). These amendments directly address, in a reasonable fashion, the comments concerning the timing of facility re-start. But, the revised Consent Decree still does not entirely prohibit operation of the Facility. First, as a matter of engineering, the Facility must be operating to examine and test the equipment and design the appropriate retrofitting equipment. (Sims Dec. ¶ 47). Second, this comment essentially presumes that the Defendant has already been found liable for violating the Clean Air Act. Although EPA's March 2014 Notice of Violation and the Complaint in this action allege that BLP's restart, and subsequent operation without a permit that incorporated PSD requirements, violated the Clean Air Act, these allegations have not been proven in an administrative or judicial forum. The Decree is a settlement and all settlements necessarily involve some compromise. In a settlement of Clean Air Act violations, it is reasonable to include a compliance schedule whereby the settlement defendant is given some time to design and install pollution control equipment. (Sims Dec. ¶ 5; Burke Dec. ¶ 7). Thus, this comment does not provide a basis to conclude that the settlement should not be entered.

Comment: A few commenters, including the Tribe, stated that the Consent Decree should require BLP to obtain a new permit that complies with the PSD permitting process. (Exh. 3).

Response: ¹¹ Again, this comment presumes that the Defendant has already been found liable, and ignores that the Decree is, at bottom, and product of a negotiated compromise. There has been no finding that the Facility triggered the PSD permitting process. Instead, the parties have settled their claims and, as part of that settlement, the United States has obtained an

¹¹ For a more detailed response, see Exhibit 4, Response to Issue #16.

agreement on specific emission limits and the installation of specified pollution control equipment immediately, in lieu of proceeding to trial and its inherent uncertainties. The Decree efficiently secures real emission reductions through control technology and emission limits that are not subject to the uncertainties of the litigation and permitting processes. (Sims Dec. ¶ 29). Thus, this comment does not provide a basis for concluding that the Consent Decree is not fair, reasonable, consistent with the Clean Air Act, or in the public interest.

Comment: A number of commenters raised concerns about BLP's financial ability and intent to comply with the proposed Consent Decree. Commenters pointed to BLP's outstanding debts to the City of Blue Lake for rent, to the District for permit fees, and to BLP's history of non-compliance. Both the Tribe and the Bureau of Indian Affairs suggested that the Consent Decree should require BLP to provide a bond to cover the costs of compliance and penalties. (Exh. 3).

Response: ¹² The United States shares the commenters' concerns regarding BLP's financial resources. BLP is a relatively small operation, the control equipment and engineering will be expensive, and BLP has not been operating (or generating income) for over a year. The United States acknowledges BLP's outstanding debt, although it notes that BLP paid its outstanding permit fees through June 30, 2016 in May. (Wilson Dec. ¶ 10). However, even assuming that BLP is in financial difficulty, it is reasonable to proceed with the Consent Decree, even without a financial bond.

First, BLP's recent actions have evinced an intent and ability to perform the Consent Decree requirements. BLP has submitted three required plans to EPA and the District that demonstrate an understanding of the requirements of the Consent Decree and an ability to

¹² For a more detailed response, please see Exhibit 4, Response to Issues #20-23.

comply with those technical requirements. (Sims Dec. ¶ 36; Wilson Decl. ¶ 20, 22). BLP has also informed EPA that it has purchased equipment to repair the ESP. (Sims Dec. ¶ 41).

Second, the provisions of the Consent Decree, and the consequences of non-compliance, provide sufficient enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. If Defendant fails to comply with any of its terms, including deadlines, it will be subject to stipulated penalties under the Consent Decree. *See* (Exh. 1, Section IX). Defendant will not be excused from any obligations based on its financial inability to comply with the Decree. *Id.* ¶ 62. In the event stipulated penalties are insufficient to enforce compliance, the United States may return to court to seek sanctions for contempt of a court order. *See* Fed. R. of Civ. P. 70. Third, it is in the public interest to have an entered Consent Decree, with specific and certain requirements, that provides for enforcement by this Court, rather than to litigate against a financially unstable entity that can continue to operate without the Consent Decree restrictions in the meantime.

Comment: Commenters, including those submitting a form letter, raised issues regarding smoke from the stack, fugitive ash on their properties, and public health impacts of the particulate matter deposition from the Facility. The Tribe commented that the Consent Decree should require Defendant to pay for joint particulate matter monitoring stations. (Exh. 3)

Response: ¹³ The United States recognizes and is aware of the community's concerns regarding fugitive ash and dust and particulate matter from the Facility. The emission reductions obtained through the Consent Decree, including through BLP's contribution to the Wood Stove Replacement Program, will provide environmental benefits to the community surrounding the Facility. Although PM_{2.5} is not a pollutant at issue in this action, the same control equipment (ESP) that reduces PM₁₀ emissions also is used to control PM_{2.5} emissions. (Sims Dec. ¶ 40). In

¹³ For a more detailed response, please see Exhibit 4, Response to Issues #17-18.

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addition, the reductions of CO and NOx will provide pollution reduction benefits to the surrounding community. As to the joint monitoring stations, this Consent Decree is the product of a negotiated resolution and prioritizes spending on pollution control equipment.

Comment: Commenters noted that the Consent Decree should address a number of additional issues, including greenhouse gas emissions, lead, odors, noise, traffic, impacts to waterways, sulfur dioxide (SOx), VOC, arsenic, and opacity. (Exh. 3)

Response: ¹⁴ This action only resolves PSD claims for CO, NO_x, and PM₁₀. Defendant is not receiving a covenant not to sue for any other claims under this settlement. (Exh. 1, \P 87).

CONCLUSION

The terms of the Consent Decree are fair, reasonable, and consistent with applicable law and the public interest. Further, the Defendant has consented to entry of the settlement without condition. The United States, therefore, respectfully requests that this Court approve and enter the proposed Consent Decree by signing page 41 of the proposed Consent Decree submitted with this Motion as Exhibit 1.

Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of September, 2016

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¹⁴ For a detailed response, please see Exhibit 4, Responses to Issues # 25-28.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of September 2016, I caused the foregoing MOTION TO ENTER CONSENT DECREE to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using this Court's CM/ECF system, which will send notice of such filing to counsel of record for all parties.

/s/ Sheila McAnaney

SHEILA McANANEY
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Environmental Enforcement Section
Environment & Natural Resources
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